

## Emerging Repertoires of Political Participation in Lithuania: A Latent Class Analysis

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**Abstract.** *Most scholars argue that the decline of citizen participation and confidence in political institutions might be explained as the transformation of traditional forms of political participation to new ones. However, some authors indicate that citizens are not exclusively oriented towards institutionalized or de-institutionalized forms of participation and use all available mechanisms of influence by participating in various forms of action. The focus of this article is an empirical investigation of repertoires of political participation in Lithuania. The article, which is based on the data of the fifth wave of the European Values Study, concludes that repertoires of political participation in Lithuania are diversified and complex. They are significantly associated with gender, age, education, income, place of residence, interpersonal trust, confidence in political institutions, materialist/postmaterialist values, authority orientations, democratic support, autocratic orientations, and family socialization. The repertoires of the all-around activists, the duty-based participants, and the low-involved protesters are mixed and include all forms of political participation. However, there is a slightly noticeable trend toward the repertoire of an assertive citizen among the low-involved protesters and the apolitical volunteers.*

**Keywords:** *repertoires of political participation, latent political participation, manifest political participation*

**Raktažodžiai:** *politinio dalyvavimo repertuarai, latentinis politinis dalyvavimas, pasireiškiantis politinis dalyvavimas*

### Introduction

The declining level of citizen participation and confidence in political institutions is an essential matter of concern in representative democracies. Citizen participation informs the government about citizens' needs and preferences, contributes to better policy decisions, and, together with confidence in political institutions, makes them legitimate. Some scholars argue that declining levels of citizen participation weaken representative democracies and might disrupt the essential social and cultural preconditions for viable democracy (Putnam, 2000). However, advocates of the transformation theory are more positive. They argue that the decline of political participation, as well as political distrust of some segments of society, might be explained as the transformation of traditional forms of citizen participation to new ones. Declining levels of participation among young people do not mean that young adults are not interested in politics or are alienated from the political process in case the young people are attached to principles of democracy (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2003; Inglehart & Welzer, 2005; Norris, 1999).

Furthermore, some authors point out that current approaches to political participation are too exclusive because of one-sided support for the crisis of democracy or transformation thesis. They argue that citizens nowadays are not exclusively oriented towards institutionalized or de-

institutionalized forms of political participation. They use all available channels of expression and mechanisms of influence by participating in various forms of action (Hooghe & Dejaeghere, 2007; Hustinx, 2012; Oser, 2017). Advocates of the pluralization thesis indicate that young adults often merge traditional and new forms of political participation (Hustinx, 2012).

Whereas most of the studies on the transformation or expanding repertoires of political participation are based on research in advanced democracies, there is a lack of a comprehensive analysis of repertoires of political participation in new democracies. It is not contested that political participation in new democracies exhibits different patterns of political participation, even if some trends of political behaviour that are observed in advanced democracies have been detected in contemporary democracies as well (Barnes, 2006; Gaidytė & Muis, 2019).

Addressing the repertoires of political participation in Lithuania, we use a broad concept of political participation introduced by Ekman and Amna (2012). The concept includes measures of latent and manifest political participation, and it may provide a better understanding of repertoires of political participation in new democracies. The idea of latent participation is in line with optimistic claims that nonparticipation in the political process might hide attentiveness to politics and might be sensitive to mobilization efforts in case political action is required. Our findings might contribute to scientific knowledge regarding political alienation and protest potential in new democracies.

Our next contribution is the use of a latent class analysis that derives a probabilistic model of clustering from finding out repertoires of political participation in the Lithuanian context (Leisch, 2004). More specifically, a latent class analysis is a valuable tool to determine probabilities of participation in political actions in certain latent classes.

We examine to what extent the explanations based on advanced democracies might be useful to explain repertoires of political participation in the Lithuanian context. More precisely, we contribute to scientific knowledge of repertoires of latent and manifest political participation in new democracies regarding theoretical constructs of allegiant and assertive citizens. In this study, we consider allegiant citizens and assertive citizens as ideal types and use them for an analysis of actual repertoires of political participation in Lithuania.

The focus of the article is an empirical investigation of repertoires of political participation in Lithuania. What repertoires of political participation can be identified? How can differences among particular repertoires of political participation in Lithuania be explained?

The study method is an analysis of the data of the fifth wave of the European Values Study carried out in Lithuania in 2017. The European Values Study includes a block of questions regarding latent and manifest political participation together with blocks of questions on values and attitudes towards political institutions. A latent class analysis is used to find out repertoires of political participation. Further, binary logistic regressions are performed for the purpose to explain repertoires of political participation in terms of normative types of allegiant and assertive citizens.

We expect to find out a repertoire of allegiant citizens among a group of Lithuanian citizens because of prevailing materialist and mixed values in society as well as paternalistic and conformist attitudes towards the state and its institutions as the impact of the Soviet legacy (Savicka, 2004; Žiliukaitė 2016). We are rather sceptical concerning the repertoires of assertive citizens because the young adults have not grown in the vacuum, which means they are affected by their social and cultural environment (Savicka, 2001). In addition, we expect to find out a repertoire of activists that combines traditional and new forms of political participation (Hustinx, 2012; Imbrasaitė, 2013).

### **Concept of political participation**

The notion of political participation is frequently contested, because of its conceptual confusion, difficulties in integrating its normative and operational aspects and updating them to recent developments in representative democracies. Consequently, there have been developed many conceptualizations and typologies of political participation in theoretical and empirically driven studies (Verba & Nie, 1972; Kaase & March 1979; Parry, Moyser & Day, 1992; Verba, Scholzman & Brady, 1995; Teorell et al. 2007; Ekman & Amna, 2012).

The definition of political participation is closely related to the labelling “political” and “unpolitical”. In the earlier studies on political participation, the notion of the “political” was associated with activities of the governmental institutions, and it resulted in narrow definitions of political participation. Political participation is narrowly defined as citizens’ actions aimed at influencing decisions of governmental institutions (Verba & Nie, 1972; Kaase & March 1979; Parry, Moyser & Day, 1992; Verba, Scholzman & Brady, 1995). This line of thought has been followed by a variety of typologies of political actions distinguishing between conventional and unconventional political participation (Verba & Nie, 1972; Kaase & March, 1979).

The most widely used narrow definition of political participation is introduced by Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978), and it refers to the election of politicians and approval of their policies. Political participation is defined as “<...> legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions that they take (Verba, Nie & Kim 1978, 1). Consequently, Verba and others (1978) proposed typology, encompassing four modes of political participation such as voting, contacting, campaign activity, and communal activity. Furthermore, Verba and others (1978) argue that the definition of political participation depends on a researcher and its interests. The definition was innovative at that time because it included not only electoral behaviour such as voting and campaign activities but also other forms of citizen actions.

Similarly, Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995, 39) defined political participation narrowly as “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies”. However, they recognized that a target of political actions might be not only political actors but also private and social ones. In addition, Verba and others (1995) provide the typology of eight modes of political participation such as voting, contacting, campaign work, campaign contribution, political mail contribution, community activity, membership in political organizations, protesting.

More recent studies of political participation point out the emergence of new forms of political behaviour in representative democracies such as political consumerism and indicate that narrow definitions, as well as typologies of political participation, need to be updated (Teorell and others, 2014; Ekman & Amna, 2012). Teorell and others (2007, 343) rejected previously used the dichotomy of conventional and unconventional political participation. They argue that the distinction between the channels of expression and the mechanisms of influence contribute to a better understanding of political participation in representative democracies (Teorell and others, 2007). Furthermore, Teorell and others (2014) suggested the broader typology of political participation, encompassing five forms of political actions such as voting, party activity, consumer participation, protest activity, contacting.

Based on previous definitions of political participation and Schudson’s (1998) concept of monitorial citizen, Ekman and Amna (2012) proposed a broad typology of political participation (Table 1 from Ekman & Amna, 2012, 292). Following Schudson’s (1998) idea of a monitorial citizen, Ekman and Amna (2012) argue that nonparticipation might hide attentiveness to politics, and it might turn out to political action under certain circumstances (Ekman & Amna, 2012). Some of the activities might look non-political or semi-political in case they are not “directly aimed at influencing people in power” (Ekman & Amna, 2012, 288). However, they are essential in representative democracies and are in line with current political and social developments. Attentiveness to the political process and civic engagement might be perceived as latent political participation.

Manifest political participation in Ekman’s and Amna’s typology (2012, 298) refers to “all actions directed towards influencing governmental decisions and political outcomes” and is “goal-oriented or rational, observable and measurable”. Furthermore, manifest political participation may be differentiated between formal participation or electoral behaviour and activism (Ekman and Amna, 2012). Formal participation is defined as “the wishes of ordinary citizens to influence politics and political outcomes in society, or the decisions that affect public affairs” (Ekman & Amna, 2012, 298). Furthermore, formal manifest participation might be individual, such as electoral activities (voting and contacting), and collective such as organized participation (membership in a political party, a

trade union, or any organization with political agenda) (Ekman & Amna, 2012). Activism (extra-parliamentary activities) in Ekman's and Amna's typology is differentiated between legal and illegal activities. Legal activism on the individual level is signing a petition, boycotting products and legal activism on the collective level includes participation in strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of protest actions. In addition, legal activism contains membership or activity within political parties or groups outside of the parliamentary sphere such as social movements or political action groups (Ekman & Amna, 2012). Illegal activism on an individual level combines "politically motivated unlawful acts on an individual basis" and illegal activism on a collective level encompasses illegal activities such as protests such as "demonstrations, riots, squatting buildings, damaging property, confrontations with the police or political opponents" (Ekman & Amna, 2012, 292).

**Table 1. Latent and manifest political participation**

CIVIL PARTICIPATION (LATENT POLITICAL PARTICIPATION)		MANIFEST POLITICAL PARTICIPATION		
Involvement (attention)	Civic engagement (action)	Formal political participation	Activism (extra-parliamentary participation)	
			Legal	Illegal
<b>INDIVIDUAL FORMS</b>				
Personal interest in politics and societal issues  Attentiveness to political issues	Activities based on personal interest in and attention to politics and societal issues	Electoral participation and contact activities	Extra-parliamentary forms of participation: to make one voice heard or to make a difference by individual means (e.g. signing petitions, political consumption)	Politically motivated unlawful acts on an individual basis
<b>COLLECTIVE FORMS</b>				
A sense of belonging to a group or a collective with a distinct political profile or agenda  Life-style related politics (e.g. identity, clothes, music, food, values)	Voluntary work to improve conditions in the local community, for charity, or to help others (outside the own family and circle of friends)	Organized political participation: membership in conventional political parties, trade unions, and organizations	Loosely organized forms or network-based political participation: new social movements, demonstrations, strikes, and protests	Illegal and violent activities and protests: demonstrations, riots, squatting buildings, damaging property, confrontations with the police or political opponents

Source: Ekman & Amna (2012) *Political participation and civic engagement: Towards a new typology. Human Affairs, 22, 28-300.*

Ekman's and Amna's (2012) concept of latent political participation is innovative, and it is in line with the current debate regarding the transformation of forms of political participation. Nonparticipation might have two faces or hide two types of citizens - monitorial citizens, who are attentive to politics and participate in individual and de-institutionalized ways, and apolitical citizens, who are not attentive to politics and do not participate in political actions. Furthermore, the idea that nonparticipation might hide attentiveness to politics and might have political consequences under certain circumstances might contribute to an analysis of emerging repertoires of political participation in "third wave" democracies. Characteristics of economic and cultural contexts are often intermediated between an individual and political action.

### **Transforming repertoires of political actions**

The transformation of forms of political participation is caused by developments of the welfare state, changes in the structure of societies, and a silent shift of values from survival to self-expression ones (Inglehart & Welzer, 2005). Proponents of the transformation thesis indicate that traditional forms of participation which are based on survival values are replaced by more individualized forms of participation which are based on self-expression values (Dalton, 2008; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2001; Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 1999). Although young people are more critical towards bureaucratized

institutions of representative democracy, they are attached to the principles of democracy and participate in more individualized ways (Norris 2002). Young people often are organized in informal and flexible ways, avoiding membership and hierarchy of bureaucratized institutions and relying on social media for mobilization of protest actions (Breuer, 2016). Protest actions are often expressive, oriented towards non-instrumental and universalist concerns, and a target group of participants is usually not the political elite, but a civil society (Nash, 2010; Norris, 1999).

New forms of participation are based on cognitive mobilization that is stipulated by the social modernization process (Dalton & Welzer, 2014; Inglehart & Welzer 2005). Rising levels of education and knowledge, decreasing respect to authority, and expectations of living standards often stipulate critical attitudes and skepticism toward governmental institutions.

In the same line, Dalton and Welzer (2014) argue that processes of social modernization and rising levels of knowledge and skills have an impact on the transformation of citizen participation from traditional to more direct and specific issue-oriented ones. According to Dalton and Welzer (2014) *allegiant citizens*, who are characterized by participation in electoral activities and respect to political institutions, are replaced by *assertive citizens*, who are skeptical towards authority and participate in elite-challenging actions. A sense of duty to vote is a characteristic of *allegiant citizens* and it is not a case of an *assertive citizen*. *Allegiant citizens* are involved in politics and participate in the political process in traditional ways, such as electoral activity and civic participation (Dalton & Welzer, 2014). They respect political authorities, comply with legal rules, and participate in conventional forms of legitimacy granting activities. On the other side, *assertive citizens* are highly involved in politics, but are skeptical concerning the bureaucratized institutions and participate in more individualized and non-institutionalized ways (Dalton & Welzer, 2014). They strongly support democracy, control political institutions and hold them accountable, but they less support the practice of democracy in a particular society and participate in elite-challenging activities (Dalton & Welzer, 2014). In addition, the *allegiant citizens* differ from the *assertive citizens* by their materialist values oriented to order and security as well as deference to authority in certain fields of their life (Inglehart & Welzer, 2005). On the opposite, *postmaterialist* or *emancipative* values predominate among the *assertive citizens* and their authority orientations are to some extent disrespectful and disobedient.

Technological progress, individualization, and globalization imply the decline of the traditional model of participation based on civic duty, allegiance to governmental institutions, and expertise. Nowadays citizens scan "the informational environment in a way so that they may be alerted on a very wide variety of issues for a very wide variety of ends and might be mobilized around those issues in a large variety of ways" (Schudson, 1998, 310). Because of social media and progress in technologies, everyday citizens are exposed to a variety of issues, values, and political events. Consequently, citizens heavily rely on social media and they are getting more monitorial than informed (Schudson, 1998).

Besides, the transformation thesis, recent research supports the thesis of expanding repertoires of participation (Dejaeghere & Hooghe, 2006; Hunstix et al, 2012; Imbrasaitė, 2013). Verba (2015, 1885) agrees that socioeconomic and political contexts are changing, but indicates that "citizens in many countries and at all ages are faced with societies that do not produce secure economies and sturdy policies that foster *allegiant* and *materialist* values". Consequently, some authors point out that current approaches to citizen participation are too exclusive, because of one-sided support for transformation thesis or the crisis of democracy thesis. They argue that citizens nowadays are not exclusively oriented towards institutionalized or de-institutionalized forms of participation, they often participate in all available forms of participation and mix them (Hooghe & Dejaeghere, 2007; Hustinx, 2012; Oser, 2017).

We assume the *allegiant citizens* and the *assertive citizens* as ideal types in our analysis. The ideal type of *allegiant citizen* corresponds to an individual who trusts in political institutions, is compliant with legal rules, and participates in the political process in traditional ways. The ideal type of *assertive citizen* corresponds to an individual who is interested in politics, attached to the principles of democracy, but is critical towards political institutions and participates in the political process in a

non-traditional manner. We expect to find out a repertoire of the allegiant citizens because of prevailing materialist and mixed values in the society as well as paternalistic and conformist attitudes towards the governmental institutions as a legacy of the Soviet regime (Savicka, 2004, Žiliukaitė, 2016). We are rather sceptical about finding out the repertoires of the assertive citizen in Lithuania because the young generation has not grown in the vacuum and is affected by their social and cultural environment (Savicka, 2001). In addition, we expect to find out a repertoire of all-around activists that combines traditional and new forms of political participation (Hunstix, 2012; Imbrasaitė, 2013).

## Method

The method of the study is an analysis of the fifth wave data of the European Values Study (2017) from Lithuania that includes 1438 respondents. This survey includes questions regarding latent and manifest political participation as well as materialistic/postmaterialistic values in the Lithuanian context. It also has to be acknowledged that the question regarding volunteering is too general and does not discriminate between volunteering in public or private organizations as well as volunteering in political parties, trade unions, and other organizations that are important in terms of their agenda of participation.

To find out repertoires of political participation in Lithuania, based on Ekman's and Amna's (2012) concept of political participation, we included 17 questions dealing with latent and manifest political participation from the questionnaire of European Values Study (Lithuania, 2017) (Appendix, Table 1) for our analysis.

Latent political participation encompasses involvement (attention) and civic engagement (action). Civic engagement is measured by three blocks of questions that include volunteering, membership in organizations, and following politics on mass media. We constructed an index of membership in non-governmental organizations (Cronbach's alpha .78). As there are no detailed questions concerning activities of a particular non-governmental organization in the questionnaire of the European Values Study, we classified membership in non-governmental organizations as civic participation. This classification is based on assumptions from previous research (Imbrasaitė, 2013; Janušauskienė, 2002). Non-governmental organizations in Lithuania often are oriented and perform a function of socialization, instead of control of governmental institutions, because of the lack of organizational capacities and opportunity structures.

Finally, we constructed an index of frequency of use of traditional media (Cronbach's alpha .74) that consists of three measures: following politics on TV, radio, and in daily papers). The distinction between traditional media and social media is important because the use of social media may foster individual and collective extra-parliamentary actions, and there is a clear division between older and younger adults in terms of traditional and social media consumption in Lithuania (Imbrasaitė, 2013).

Formal political participation involves electoral participation and organized political participation. To measure electoral participation, we included voting and created an index of membership in trade unions and political parties (Cronbach's alpha .78). Activism encompasses measures of legal activities such as signing a petition, boycotting, participation in demonstrations as well as illegal activism such as participation in an illegal strike. In the line of Ekman's and Amna's (2012) conceptualization of political participation used in this paper, we include actual protest and protest potential.

The aim of the second part of the empirical analysis is to examine predictors of a repertoire of political participation. To find out predictors of repertoires of latent and manifest participation, seven binary logistic regressions were performed (Table 4). Individual background characteristics, values, attitudes, and family socialization were taken into account by performing binary logistic regressions (Appendix, Table 2).

To find out the effect of individual attitudes and value orientations, first, we included an index of materialist/postmaterialist values from the survey, but as the percentage of postmaterialists in each group was rather low, the index of materialist/postmaterialist values was recorded in two categories

(1 = materialist, 2 = nonmaterialist that include mixed and postmaterialist respondents; the reference category is “nonmaterialist”). Furthermore, there was created an index of confidence in political institutions (Cronbach’s alpha .74) that included three items (confidence in the parliament, the government, and political parties).

Further, there was created an index of law abidance (Cronbach’s alpha .80), encompassing four items that measure justification of violation of legal rules (claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to; cheating on tax if you have the chance, someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties, avoiding a fare on public transport).

To assess the effect of family socialization, the index of parents’ attention to politics (Cronbach’s alpha = .81), when a respondent was about 14 years old, was created. The index consists of six statements about a respondent’s mother and father.

### Repertoires of political participation in Lithuania

A latent class analysis (LCA) using the Mplus program was conducted to classify respondents based on their latent and manifested political participation. We use twelve indicators of latent and manifest forms of political participation that included ten categorical and two-scale variables (Table 2). The most important criteria for evaluating the fit of the latent class model are the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), change in likelihood ratio chi-square statistics  $L^2$ , and entropy. Entropy usually complements the BIC and the  $L^2$ . The smaller BIC and  $L^2$ , the better model fit of latent classes analysis and, on the opposite, the higher entropy, the better model fit. The difference of  $L^2$  between the model of seven classes and the model of eight classes is small, and it means that solution of the eight classes model is not optimal because of the small change of the BIC. We use the model of seven classes in our analysis because the value of entropy over 0.8 is acceptable, and this model is the most appropriate to the normative theoretical framework of our analysis (Table 2).

Table 2. Models of latent class analysis for latent and manifest political participation

NUMBER OF CLASSES IN LCA MODEL	BIC	$L^2$	% CHANGE $L^2$	ENTROPY
1	31441,11	31368,05		
2	28927,67	28784,72	8,24%	0,873
3	28322,27	28109,40	2,35%	0,818
4	28174,60	27891,88	0,77%	0,786
5	28141,80	27789,21	0,37%	0,866
6	27952,49	27530,00	0,93%	0,848
7	<b>27866,78</b>	<b>27374,40</b>	<b>0,57%</b>	<b>0,837</b>
8	27894,96	27332,69	<b>0,15%</b>	0,851

Source: European Values Study (Lithuania, 2017;  $n = 1438$ ).

Table 3. Repertoires of latent and manifested forms of political participation in Lithuania

LATENT CLASS PROBABILITIES	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	% IN TOTAL SAMPLE
1. Importance of politics								
very important	0.03	0.05	0.17	0.09	0.00	0.04	0.07	5.9
important	0.18	0.13	0.43	0.37	0.07	0.06	0.13	18.9
not important	0.48	0.62	0.41	0.46	0.65	0.51	0.28	49.9
not important at all	0.31	0.20	0.00	0.09	0.28	0.39	0.53	25.2
2. Interested in politics								
very interested	0.03	0.05	0.22	0.11	0.01	0.00	0.00	5.9
somewhat interested	0.24	0.31	0.72	0.76	0.28	0.06	0.02	33.6
not very interested	0.55	0.58	0.06	0.12	0.58	0.61	0.31	41.9
not at all interested	0.19	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.33	0.68	18.6
3. NGO membership								
member	0.24	0.27	0.48	0.26	0.23	0.19	0.15	26.6
not a member	0.76	0.73	0.52	0.74	0.77	0.81	0.85	73.4
4. Political party and /or trade union membership								

LATENT CLASS PROBABILITIES	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	% IN TOTAL SAMPLE
member	0.05	0.02	0.24	0.11	0.07	0.05	0.00	7.9
not a member	0.95	0.98	0.77	0.90	0.93	0.96	1.00	92.1
5. Volunteering								
did voluntary work	0.13	0.10	0.34	0.21	0.16	0.25	0.08	18.0
did not	0.88	0.90	0.66	0.79	0.85	0.75	0.92	82.0
6. Voting in national elections								
always	0.26	0.36	0.53	0.69	0.19	0.11	0.17	31.5
usually	0.58	0.62	0.43	0.28	0.71	0.67	0.50	56.2
never	0.16	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.10	0.22	0.33	12.3
7. Signing petitions								
signed	0.12	0.00	0.31	0.26	0.24	0.14	0.00	15.8
would sign	0.18	0.15	0.67	0.71	0.73	0.85	0.07	49.3
would never sign	0.70	0.85	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.93	34.9
8. Boycotting								
boycotted	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.10	0.09	0.04	0.00	6.3
would boycott	0.01	0.02	0.71	0.72	0.83	0.90	0.00	46.4
would never boycott	0.99	0.98	0.11	0.18	0.08	0.06	1.00	47.3
9. Participation in demonstrations								
participated	0.01	0.00	0.19	0.29	0.08	0.00	0.00	7.6
would participate	0.09	0.08	0.73	0.66	0.84	0.90	0.01	49.5
would never	0.90	0.92	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.10	0.99	42.9
10. Participation in illegal strikes								
participated	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	1.2
would participate	0.01	0.00	0.45	0.52	0.57	0.72	0.00	31.6
would never	0.99	1.00	0.51	0.45	0.42	0.28	1.00	67.2
11. Media consumption (1 = every day, 5 = never)								
traditional media	2.83	2.45	1.40	2.34	3.16	3.91	4.63	
social media	1.91	4.71	2.09	4.67	1.95	4.32	3.96	

Note: I = low involved non-protesters; II = low involved voters; III = all-around activists; IV = duty-based participants; V = low involved protesters; VI = apolitical volunteers; VII = disengaged

Source: European Values Study (Lithuania, 2017; n = 1438)

Low-involved non-protesters – the first class (13.5 % of the population) has relatively low levels of involvement in politics, civil participation, electoral participation, and extremely low extra-parliamentary activism. Firstly, this group does not consider politics very important in their life – the likelihood of considering politics very important (.08) and important (.18) in their life is relatively low. The likelihood of being very interested (.03) and interested (.24) in politics is relatively low as well. Similarly, electoral participation is relatively low. This group is underrepresented in participation in every national election (.26), and the likelihood of their participation in any national election is relatively high (.26). Even their membership in voluntary organizations is relatively medium (.24), the probability of volunteering is low (.13). They are characterized by extremely low levels of actual participation and potential of participation in individual (probability of signing petitions - .18, would never signing petitions .70; boycotting is .00, would never boycotting .99) as well as collective (participation in demonstrations .01, would never participate in demonstrations .90) extra-parliamentary activities. In terms of media consumption, this group more often uses social media, than traditional media. On average, they use social media even more often than several times a week (1.91) and traditional media about one or two times a week (2.80).

Low-involved voters – the second class (15% of the population) has relatively low levels of involvement in politics, civil participation, and extra-parliamentary activities, but their participation in national elections is relatively high. They do not consider politics as very important in their life – the likelihood of considering politics very important (.03) and important (.15) is relatively low, but the likelihood of being very interested (.05) and interested (.31) in politics, as well as volunteering (.10), is higher than among low involved non-protesters. They predominantly participate in national elections and, even if, the likelihood of voting in every national election is not high (.36), they usually



participate in national elections (.62) and their likelihood of nonparticipation is extremely low (.02). On average they use traditional media several times a week (2.45), but rarely use social media (4.71).

All-around activists – the third class (16.1% of the population) represents the group that is overrepresented almost in all forms of political participation. They predominantly consider politics as very important (.15) or important (.45) in their life, almost all of them are interested in politics (.94), are involved in formal organizations such as trade unions and political parties (.16) as well as other voluntary organizations (.46), volunteer (.34). They vote in every national election (.53) or usually vote (.43), and the likelihood of not participating in elections (.05) is extremely low. This group has a relatively high probability of manifest and potential participation in legal forms of extra-parliamentary actions with the highest likelihood of participation in individual forms such as signing petitions and participation in boycotts. The likelihood of signing (.31) or would signing (.67) petitions and participation in a boycott (.12) or would boycotting (.71) among this group is the highest in comparison with other classes. This group is a bit underrepresented in participation (.19) and would participate (.73) in demonstrations in comparison with the group of active voters. They are characterized by high levels of consumption of traditional media and social media. They most often use traditional media in comparison with other classes. On average, they use traditional media almost every day (1.40) and social media several times a week (2.09).

Duty-based participants - the fourth class (9.5% of the population) are underrepresented in all forms of political participation, but their level of latent and manifest political participation is lower in comparison with “all-around activists” with except participation in each national election and demonstrations. This group has the highest likelihood of participation in every national election (.63), and the probability of their not participating in national elections (.02) is the lowest one. This category combines individual and collective extra-parliamentary activities - they have a relatively high probability of signing (.26) or would signing (0.71) petitions, boycotting (.10), or would boycott (.72) and the highest likelihood of participation in demonstrations (.72). They most often use traditional media in comparison with other classes. On average, they almost do not use social media (4.67), but this is compensated by the use of traditional media almost every day (2.34).

Low-involved protesters – the fifth class (21.7% of the population) has relatively low levels of involvement in politics, medium levels of civil and electoral participation, and relatively high levels of manifest and potential participation in extra-parliamentary activities. They combine individual and collective extra-parliamentary activities. This group has a relatively high probability of signing (.24) or would signing (0.73) petitions, boycotting (.09), or would boycott (.83) and participation (.08) and would participation (.84) in demonstrations. They most often use traditional media in comparison with other classes. In terms of media consumption, they more often use social media than traditional media. On average, they use social media even more often than several times a week (1.95) and traditional media about once or twice a week (3.16).

Apolitical volunteers – the sixth class (12.5% of the population) is underrepresented in involvement in politics and electoral participation. The likelihood of considering politics very important (.04) and important (.06) in their life, as well as interest in politics (.06), is very low. Similarly, probabilities of participation in every (.11) or not every (.67) national election as well as membership in political parties (.05) are relatively low. Despite a low probability of signing a petition (.18), boycotting (.09), and participation in demonstrations (.01), they have high probabilities of protest potential. The likelihood of not signing petitions (.01), not boycotting (.09), and not participating in a demonstration (.01) is very low. Nevertheless, they are underrepresented in membership in voluntary organizations (.19), but they have a relatively high likelihood of volunteering (.25). In terms of media consumption, they seldom use traditional media (3.91) and social media (4.32), but traditional media they use more often than social media, than traditional media.

Disengaged citizens—the seventh class (11.8 % of the population) represents citizens that are underrepresented in all types of actions, and it can be labelled as the group of “disengaged.” Despite their remarkable passivity in comparison with the other classes, this group nevertheless has a

reasonable likelihood of participation in national elections. Respectively, the likelihood of participation in each national election (.17) is lower than the likelihood of participation in national elections usually (.50). They almost do not use traditional media (4.63) and only use social media only several times a month (3.96).

Citizens' background characteristics such as gender, age, education, income, and place of residence are relevant in explaining repertoires of political participation (Table 4, Appendix Table 4). Men are significantly more likely to be among the all-around activists, and women are more likely to be among the disengaged citizens. Young people are more likely to be among the low-involved non-protesters and the low-involved protesters. Consequently, older people are more likely to be among the low-involved voters and the duty-based participants. Lower and medium education decreases chances of being an all-around activist, and lower education increases chances of being a disengaged citizen. Higher income increases the chances of being among the all-around activists and the apolitical volunteers. People, who live in rural areas, are less likely to be among the low-involved protesters, and who live in small towns, are more likely to be among the apolitical volunteers. Residents of urban areas are less likely to be among the low-involved voters and more likely among the all-around activists. People, who attend religious services more times or once a week, are more likely to be among the low-involved voters and less likely to be among the low-involved protesters and the apolitical volunteers.

**Table 4. Binary Logistic Regressions, Odds Ratios (Exp[B])**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
<i>Background characteristic</i>							
Gender (ref=male)	1.23	.93	.44***	.63	1.31	1.42	2.29*
Age	.97**	1.06***	1.01	1.05**	.96***	.99	1.01
Education (ref=higher)							.
Lower	.66	.60	.32**	1.38	.73	1.58	3.11*
Medium	.90	1.05	.39***	.96	1.34	1.22	1.70
Income	.91 (.062)	.97	1.18***	.93*	1.03	1.09***	.95
Place of residence (ref=the capital)							
Below 5000 residents	.91	1.93	.172	.71	.39**	1.34	3.10
5001-10000 residents	.75	.67	1.11	.52	.65	3.92**	4.78*
1000- 500 000 residents	1.51	.23**	2.24*	.73	1.10	.96	.61
Attendance of religious services (ref=never)							
One and more times a week	.65	3.28*	1.52	2.15	.36*	.28*	.28
Once a month or on holidays	1.12	2.15	1.61	1.79	.89	.41*	.53
Once a year or less often	1.16	1.08	.82	1.28	.83	.94	.92
<i>Individual values and attitudes</i>							
Material/Postmaterial values (ref=mixed)	1.56 (.83)	1.29	.99	1.14	.,84	.46*	1.31
Higher respect to authority (ref=bad or do not mind)	1.17	1.85*	.73	.42**	.79	1.52	1.79
Interpersonal trust (ref = can't be too careful)	.55*	1.13	1.12	.74	.81	2.29**	.69
Political trust (min=3 very much; max=12 not at all)	1.05	1.11	.75***	.73**	1.05	1.07	1.59***
Democratic support (ref= democratic system is good or very good)	2.35*	.68	1.02	1.96	2.64*	.58	1.09
Authoritarian	.89	.67	1.67*	2.10*	1.05	.63	.82

orientations (ref = strong leader is good or very good)							
Law abidance (min=4 very much; max=40 not at all)	.99	1.05*	.94**	.93*	1.03	1.09***	.95
<i>Socialization</i>							
Parents interest in politics	.98	1.07*	.90***	1.03	1.01	1.06	1.09*
Constant	.33	.01	4.38	.04*	2.29	.32*	.01**
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.10	.35	.22	.29	.21	.21	.28
Number of respondents	1438	1438	1438	1438	1438	1438	1438

Note: I = low-involved non-protesters; II = low-involved voters; III = all-around activists; IV = duty-based participants; V = low-involved protesters; VI = apolitical volunteers; VII = disengaged

Source: European Values Study (Lithuania, 2017; N= 1438).

People, who have materialist values and low interpersonal trust, are less likely to be among the apolitical volunteers. The results show that the higher interpersonal trust, the more likely they are to represent the apolitical volunteers and less likely to represent the low-involved non-protesters. The positive evaluation of change towards higher respect to the authority in society is more likely to be among the low-involved voters and less likely – among the duty-based participants. The higher political trust is less likely to be among the all-around activists and the duty-based participants and less likely to be among the disengaged citizens.

Lower democratic support increases the chances of a repertoire of the low-involved non-protesters, and the higher democratic support increases the likelihood of the repertoire of the low-involved protesters. In addition, lower support for a political system with a strong leader governing without elections decreases the chances of the repertoire of all-around activists and duty-based participants.

The higher compliance with the law is more likely among the all-around activists. The duty-based participants and the lower compliance with the law are among the low-involved voters and the apolitical volunteers.

Finally, there is a strong effect of family socialization on repertoires of participation of the all-around activists. Having parents, who followed the news and discussed politics with their children, significantly increases the probability of being an all-around activist. Having parents, who did not follow the news and did not discuss politics with their children, increases the chances of being among the low-involved voters and the disengaged citizens.

## Discussion

The claim of the fundamental generational change in repertoires of political participation in advanced democracies might be contested because of a one-sided and too exclusive approach towards repertoires of political participation. Instead of changing their repertoires of participation from allegiant to assertive ones, citizens may merge traditional and new forms and exhibit various repertoires of political participation.

The configurations among modernization, culture and political institutions may be relevant to explain emerging repertoires of political participation in new democracies. The new “third wave” democracies are characterized by lower levels of political participation, political trust, and weak attachments to principles of democracy in comparison with the advanced democracies.

In this study, based on data drawn from the survey of the European Values Study (Lithuania 2017), we considered an allegiant citizen and an assertive citizen as theoretical constructs in our analysis and used them to investigate repertoires of political participation in Lithuania. A latent class analysis identified seven distinct repertoires of participation that range from the all-around activists to the disengaged citizens as well as other repertoires, such as duty-based participants, low involved voters, low involved non-protesters, low involved protesters, apolitical volunteers. The findings indicate that repertoires of political participation in Lithuania are diverse and complex.

Sociodemographic characteristics (gender, age, education, income, place of residence), materialist/ postmaterialist values, interpersonal trust, attitudes to authority, confidence in political institutions, democratic support, authoritarian orientations, compliance with the law, and family socialization are predictors of repertoires of political participation in Lithuania.

Dalton and Welzer (2014) argue that allegiant citizens, who are characterized by respect for authority and participation in electoral activities, are replaced by assertive citizens, who are mistrustful to political institutions and participate in elite-challenging activities. According to the proponents of the transformation theory, the older people should exhibit the repertoire of political participation of allegiant citizens and the young adults – the repertoire of assertive citizens.

Our findings demonstrate that the largest proportion of the people aged 65 and over (35.0 %) exhibits the repertoire of the low involved voters, a substantial proportion (23,2 %) – the repertoire of the duty-based voters, and a significant proportion of them (15,4 %) displays the repertoire of the disengaged citizens (Appendix, Table 4).

Comparing the repertoires of political participation of the low-involved voters and the duty-based participants, we find out that the low-involved voters are underrepresented in all forms of actions, except for the similarities in voting and membership in organizations. The low-involved voters are more likely to be less politically involved, have low membership in political parties, less participate in voluntary work and protest actions, and demonstrate low protest potential in comparison with the duty-based participants. The results of the binary logistic regression show that the low-involved voters are more likely to live not in urban areas, support traditional values (religious values, deferential authority orientations), and their participation in protests and protest potential is lower in comparison with the duty-based participants. These findings are in line with the idea that deferential orientations towards authority tend to undermine the development of democratic norms (Nevitte, 2014). People, who live in rural or suburban areas tend to have more traditional values, are more resistant to changes and are more likely to know one another. Their interpersonal relationships might create a social pressure to conform to acceptable opinions and behaviour. On the other hand, people living in rural or suburban areas might have fewer choices and fewer exit options. It fosters reliance on existing mechanisms of exercising voice (Sawyer and others, 2021). In addition, the low-involved voters might not show a willingness to participate in future protest actions because of their health problems. The low-involved voters do not confirm the theoretical expectations of allegiant citizens because of low involvement in politics and low level of membership in political parties and formal organization as well as a relatively low law-abidingness.

The results of the binary logistic regression show that the duty-based participants are more likely to be associated with older age, lower income, lower respect to authority, higher confidence in political institutions, lower level of authoritarian orientations, and relatively high compliance with legal rules. Furthermore, the duty-based participants have the highest levels of confidence in political institutions and the weakest justifications of cheating on social benefits or taxes and accepting bribes among all other groups (Table 3).

The duty-based participants are characterized by the highest levels of participation in national elections, relatively high confidence in political institutions, and law abidance. However, the duty-based participants do not confirm theoretical expectations of allegiant citizens because of relatively high levels of participation in individual (signing petitions, joining in boycotts) and collective (demonstrations, strikes) forms of activism. The highest rate of persons who have participated in demonstrations in comparison with other groups is among the duty-based participants. The duty-based participants combine all forms of activities and do not make a difference between institutionalized and de-institutionalized forms of participation.

The disengaged citizens are the most politically alienated group in Lithuania. Almost all disengaged citizens are not interested in politics, although one out of five individuals in this group recognize that politics is important in their lives. Moreover, their frequency of consumption of traditional media is the lowest in comparison with other groups, and the frequency of consumption of social media is not relatively high. The disengaged citizens are not likely to be members of political

parties and are not likely to participate in protest actions, and the likelihood of protest potential is extremely low. The results of binary logistic regression show that the disengaged citizens significantly differ from other groups by sociodemographic characteristics and low confidence in political institutions. They are more likely to be women, lower educated, and live in small towns with a population of 10 000 to 100 000. It is possible to assume that the disengaged citizens lack individual resources such as time or political skills and it might make their political participation more costly in comparison with other groups (Verba, Brady & Schlozman, 1995). However, the disengaged citizens are not entirely alienated from the political process - two out of three individuals in this group participate in national elections.

From the perspective of the transformation theory, young adults should exhibit the repertoire of political participation of assertive citizens. Our findings show that the young people are more likely to be among the low-involved protesters (35.7%), the low-involved non-protesters (19.2%), and the apolitical volunteers (19.2%) (Appendix, Table 4). The low-involved protesters and low-involved non-protesters are similarly involved in politics and similarly participate in formal organizations and electoral activities. However, the two groups significantly differ according to participation in protest actions. The protest potential of the low-involved non-protesters is extremely low, but it is not the case with the low-involved protesters.

Comparing the results of binary logistic regressions of two groups, such as the low-involved non-protesters and the low-involved protesters, we found that younger age, lower interpersonal trust, and lower levels of democratic support are significantly associated with the repertoire of the low-involved non-protesters. Our findings are following the idea that low interpersonal trust does not foster participation in collective protest actions (Benson, Rochon, 2004), and it is a case of the low-involved non-protesters. The low-involved non-protesters do not confirm normative expectations of assertive citizens because of low political involvement, the lack of protest potential, and low democratic support.

The younger age, the place of residence not in rural areas, and attending religious services less than once or more times a week increase the likelihood of low-involved protesters' repertoire. The results of binary logistic regression show that the low-involved protesters are less likely to live in rural areas. It is in line with the idea that younger people, who live in urban areas, are inclined to have dense social networks, and they have better access to mobilization structures (Tilly, 1995). The costs of mobilization and campaign maintenance in urban and suburban environments are lower than in rural ones (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004). Although the trend toward an assertive repertoire among low-involved protesters is noticeable, they do not confirm normative expectations because of low involvement in politics and relatively high participation in national elections.

The repertoire of political participation of the apolitical volunteers is similar to the low-involved non-protesters in terms of involvement in politics but is different in terms of volunteering and participation in the protests. Despite a relatively high level of volunteering, the apolitical volunteers avoid membership in formal organizations, and their membership in formal organizations is not high in comparison with other groups. Although the apolitical volunteers almost do not participate in protest actions, their protest potential is high, and it is not a case of the low-involved non-protesters. The results of the binary logistic regression show that the apolitical volunteers are significantly more likely to live in small towns, not to attend religious services, to have mixed or postmaterialist values, and to have high levels of interpersonal trust. The findings are in line with the idea of the proponents of transformation theory, who argue that values are shifting from materialist to postmaterialist ones, and participation in organizations based on formal membership is transforming to participation based on informal and flexible social networks (Inglehart, 1997, Inglehart & Walzer, 2005). Although the apolitical volunteers do not confirm normative expectations of assertive citizens, because of low involvement in politics, they are characterized by a high level of protest potential. It makes the apolitical volunteers more similar to the assertive citizen in comparison with the low-involved non-protesters.

The group of the all-around activists, which includes the largest proportion (22.5 %) of people aged 35 to 65 years, is characterized by the highest levels of latent and manifest political participation. The results of the binary regression analysis demonstrate that the all-around activists are significantly different from other groups by sociodemographic characteristics (gender, education, income, size of place of residence), confidence in political institutions, attitudes towards a political system with a strong leader without elections and family socialization. They are more likely to be men, higher educated, generate higher income, and live in urban areas. The results are in line with Verba's and others' (1995) findings that educated, middle-aged men from high-income households are the most active in political actions. It is admitted that education is the most available indicator of political knowledge and skills, and it is assumed that the all-around activists have the highest level of individual resources in terms of political knowledge, skills, and money in comparison with other groups. On the other side, the all-around activists are not exceptionally young and exceptionally oriented to self-expression values. There is a relatively high percentage of materialists (30.0 %) among them in comparison with the younger groups, i.e. the low involved non-protesters and the low involved protesters (Table 4). In addition, the all-around activists are more likely to participate in membership-based organizations such as political parties trade unions, and almost all of them participate in national elections. The all-around activists are not critical towards political institutions - their confidence in political institutions is the highest in comparison with other groups. The all-around activists do not confirm theoretical expectations of assertive citizens.

Furthermore, the all-around activists do not confirm theoretical expectations of allegiant citizens. Their level of individual activism, such as signing petitions, joining in boycotts is the highest among all the groups. However, their level of participation in elections is lower than the duty-based participants. Similarly, the percentage of the all-around activists, who hold the opinion that the higher respect for authority might be a good change in a society, is lower than the duty-based participants. The same trend is noticeable with law abidance. Although law abidance among the all-around activists is relatively high, it is lower than among the duty-based participants. It might be assumed that compliance with legal rules increases with age (Letki,2006). The characteristics of the all-around activists are mixed. The all-around activists expand their repertoire of political participation by merging traditional and new forms of political participation.

The results of our analysis revealed that two groups such as the all-around activists and the duty-based participant are mostly involved in politics and more likely to combine institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political participation. The characteristics of these two groups are mixed. Consequently, the transformation thesis might be contested in the Lithuanian context, although the trend toward an assertive repertoire among the low-involved protesters as well as the apolitical volunteers is slightly noticeable. According to Verba (2015), materialist and allegiant values toward political authorities are facilitated in societies where economic survival and poverty is an essential matters of concern among large segments of the population.

The analysis shows that a significant part of citizens in Lithuania have a relatively traditional repertoire of manifest political participation that is concentrated on voting in an election and much lower extent on volunteering. However, a considerable part of Lithuanian citizens has high levels of protest potential, even if they do not have participated in protest actions yet.

Our study of repertoires of political participation in Lithuania is limited by the questionnaire of the European Values Study (Lithuania 2017). To get a more comprehensive view of repertoires of political participation in Lithuania as well as in other new democracies, it is necessary to have a questionnaire better adapted for analysis of latent and manifest political participation.

### **Conclusions**

The configurations among modernization, culture, and political institutions are relevant to explain emerging repertoires of political participation in "third wave" democracies. The characteristics of the economic, social, and cultural contexts intermediate between an individual and political action.

The repertoires of political participation in Lithuania are complex and diversified. A latent class analysis identified seven distinct repertoires of participation that range from all-around activists to disengaged citizens as well as other repertoires, such as duty-based participants, low involved voters, low involved non-protesters, low involved protesters, apolitical volunteers. The results of binary logistic regressions reveal that repertoires of political participation are significantly associated with gender, age, education, income, the size of living place, frequency of attendance of religious services, interpersonal trust, materialist/postmaterialist values, authority orientations, confidence in political institutions, evaluations of a political system with the strong leader without elections, democratic support, compliance with the law, and family socialization.

Our findings demonstrate that the large proportions of the older people (65 years and over) exhibit the repertoire of the low involved voters and the duty-based voters. A substantial proportion of the older people displays the repertoire of the disengaged citizens. However, the repertoires of political participation of these groups do not confirm the theoretical expectations of allegiant citizens. The low-involved voters and the disengaged citizens do not confirm the theoretical expectations of allegiant citizens because of low involvement in politics, low participation in membership-based organizations, and relatively low levels of law-abidingness. The duty-based participants combine all forms of activities and do not make a difference between institutionalized and de-institutionalized forms of participation.

The young people are more likely to be among the low-involved protesters, the low-involved non-protesters, and the apolitical volunteers. The low-involved non-protesters do not confirm normative expectations of assertive citizens because of low involvement in politics, the lack of protest potential, and low democratic support. The largest group of young adults exhibits the repertoire of the low-involved protesters. Although the trend toward an assertive repertoire among low-involved protesters is noticeable, they do not confirm normative expectations because of low involvement in politics and relatively high levels of participation in national elections. The apolitical volunteers do not confirm normative expectations of assertive citizens because of low involvement in politics. Therefore, the apolitical volunteers are characterized by high levels of volunteering and protest potential, making them slightly more similar to assertive citizens than the low-involved non-protesters.

The results of our analysis revealed that two groups such as the all-around activists and the duty-based participants, are the most involved in politics and combine institutionalized and de-institutionalized forms of political participation. The characteristics of those two groups are mixed. Consequently, the transformation thesis might be contested in the Lithuanian context, although the trend toward an assertive repertoire among the low-involved protesters is slightly noticeable.

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## **Politinio dalyvavimo reperturai Lietuvoje: latentinė klasių analizė**

*Anotacija*

Daugumos mokslininkų nuomone, piliečių dalyvavimo ir pasitikėjimo politinėmis institucijomis mažėjimą galima paaiškinti politinio dalyvavimo formų kaita nuo tradicinių link naujų labiau individualių politinio dalyvavimo formų. Tačiau kiti autoriai nurodo, kad piliečiai dalyvauja ne tik institucionalizuotose ar deinstitutionalizuotose politinio dalyvavimo formose, bet naudoja visas galimas poveikio formas. Šio straipsnio tikslas – nustatyti ir paaiškinti politinio dalyvavimo repertuarus Lietuvoje.

Atlikus 5-osios Europos vertybių tyrimo bangos (Lietuva, 2017) duomenų latentinę klasių ir binarines logistines analizes, straipsnyje daroma išvada, kad politinio dalyvavimo repertuarai yra įvairūs. Politinio dalyvavimo repertuarai Lietuvoje statistiškai reikšmingus siejasi su lytimi, amžiumi, išsilavinimu, pajamomis, gyvenamosios vietovės dydžiu, tarpasmeniniu pasitikėjimu, pasitikėjimu politinėmis institucijomis, materialistinėmis/postmaterialistinėmis vertybėmis, pagarba autoritetui, parama demokratijai, autokratinėmis orientacijomis ir šeimos socializacija. Aktyviųjų piliečių, pareigingųjų dalyvių ir mažai įsitraukusiųjų protestuotojų repertuarai apima visas politinio dalyvavimo formas. Ryžtingojo piliečio bruožus iš dalies galima pastebėti mažai įsitraukusiųjų ir apolitiškų savanorių repertuaruose.

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